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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against 
himself.”1  It expresses the belief that a society “based on respect for 
the individual, the determination of guilt or innocence by just 
procedures, in which the accused made no unwilling contribution 
to his conviction, [is] more important than punishing the guilty.”2  
It makes central to our country’s system of justice “[t]he principle 
that a man is not obliged to furnish the State with ammunition to 
use against him.”3  The State has the right to punish lawbreakers, 
but it cannot compel self-incrimination.4  “A man may be punished, 
even put to death, by the State; but . . . he should not be made to 
prostrate himself before its majesty.”5 
Many states—including Minnesota—require convicted sex 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment was incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
 2. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 432 (1968). 
 3. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 J. 
CLEV. B. ASS’N 91, 98 (1954). 
 4. Id. at 98-99. 
 5. Id. at 100. 
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offenders to admit to their crimes as part of their sentence.  This 
creates a number of potential Fifth Amendment violations, the 
most obvious being when an admission of guilt would destroy the 
offender’s appeal.6  An admission may also give rise to a perjury 
prosecution for an offender who testified at trial.7  Furthermore, an 
offender risks prosecution by disclosing past offenses for which he 
has not yet been prosecuted.8 
So how does one balance an offender’s Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination with society’s interest in rehabilitating sex 
offenders before releasing them from prison?  Courts throughout 
the country have wrestled with this question,9 as have many authors 
and scholars.10  There is much uncertainty surrounding the issue, 
but one thing is sure: any means the State uses must comport with 
the Constitution, for “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the 
 
 6. See, e.g., McComb v. State, 94 P.3d 715, 721 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev. 
denied, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 830 (Kan. Dec. 14, 2004); State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 
590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999). 
 7. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791; see also infra Part VII.B. 
 8. A fourth problem, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note, is the 
issue of whether the State can deny a person the right to maintain their 
innocence.  The classic Fifth Amendment situation is when the person fears that 
admissions may be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  See 
infra Part III.B.  However, there is an argument to be made that the Fifth 
Amendment recognizes the more fundamental right of a person to simply say, 
regardless of whether they will be subject to criminal prosecution or not, “I’m not 
guilty.  I just didn’t do it.” 
 9. Compare Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(determining that forcing a defendant to admit guilt or receive maximum 
sentence violated Fifth Amendment because it imposed a judicial penalty on the 
defendant), and Bankes v. Simmons, 963 P.2d 412 (Kan. 1998) (finding refusal to 
issue good time credits due to prisoner’s statements made in therapy violated his 
Fifth Amendment rights), and State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991) 
(protecting convicted sex offender from making non-immunized self-
incriminating statements), with Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 
1969) (permitting harsher sentence on an offender who would not admit his guilt 
because public’s interest in rehabilitation outweighed the offender’s rights), and 
McComb, 94 P.3d at 715 (finding no Fifth Amendment violation when State revokes 
offender’s supervised release term for refusing to sign an acceptance of 
responsibility form required under post-release treatment program). 
 10. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a 
Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 700 (1994); Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing 
Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347 (1998); 
Brendan J. Shevlin, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea:” A Look at the Fifth 
Amendment Implications of Probation Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring Mandatory 
Admissions of Guilt, 88 KY. L.J. 485 (2000); Jamie Tanabe, Right Against Self-
Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawaii’s Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the 
Fifth Amendment?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 825 (2001). 
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Constitution and the prisons of this country.”11 
This Note looks at the issue as applied to Minnesota’s prison-
based sex offender treatment program (SOTP).  Minnesota 
requires sex offenders to undergo treatment as part of their 
sentences.12  A prerequisite of admission into a treatment program 
is admitting responsibility for the offense and similar past 
offenses.13  Convicted offenders who refuse to admit responsibility 
are denied entry into treatment, resulting in an extension of their 
supervised release date and more time spent in prison.14 
The Minnesota Supreme Court justifies this by reasoning that 
supervised release is a benefit and prisoners have no liberty interest 
in a supervised release date.15  However, in a recent case not 
involving a sex offender, the court ruled that Minnesota’s 
sentencing statutes grant inmates a liberty interest in their 
supervised release dates.16  This Note argues that, because of the 
court’s new ruling, requiring sex offenders to admit their crimes 
violates their right against self-incrimination. 
This Note first discusses Minnesota’s SOTP and the state’s 
sentencing statutes.17  Next, it provides a brief historical overview of 
the Fifth Amendment, followed by case law that lays out the 
modern right against self-incrimination.18  This Note then discusses 
the pertinent Supreme Court cases,19 followed by Minnesota case 
law relating to the sentencing of sex offenders.20  This Note argues 
that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme—viewed in light of a recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision—violates sex offenders’ rights 
against self-incrimination when they are required to admit their 
crimes in order to participate in therapy.21  This Note concludes by 
proposing solutions to the problem that will properly balance 
society’s interests with those of the sex offenders.22 
 
 11. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part V.A.3. 
 16. See infra Part V.C. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. See infra Part VI. 
 22. See infra Part VII. 
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II.  MINNESOTA LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING SEX OFFENDERS 
A.   Minnesota’s Sex Offender Treatment Program 
Research has shown that inmates who successfully complete a 
SOTP are less likely to reoffend than those who quit or are 
terminated from the program.23  A study that tracked sex offenders 
over a nine-year period showed that only fourteen percent of the 
offenders who successfully completed the treatment program were 
rearrested for a new sex offense.24  This is in comparison to a rate of 
twenty-one percent who received no treatment and thirty percent 
who did not complete treatment.25  Sex offender recidivism rates 
are typically high,26 but rates for offenders released from Minnesota 
prisons have dropped fifty percent between the years of 1992 and 
1999.27 
Given these statistics, Minnesota understandably grants judges 
the power to mandate convicted sex offenders to undergo therapy 
while incarcerated.28  The Legislature has mandated that the 
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections29 (DOC) provide 
sex offender treatment for adults and juveniles committed to the 
custody of the Commissioner and adult offenders for whom 
 
 23. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., PROGRAMS FOR SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003), 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Programs.pd
f; see MARY ELLISON, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, OJP FACT SHEET 2 (2004), 
http://www.ojp.state.mn.us/cj/publications/FS-2004-001_Sex_Offenders.pdf. 
 24. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
 27. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1. 
 28. Another method of treating sex offenders is through civil commitment 
under Minnesota’s Sexually Psychopathic Personality Act, MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, 
subd. 18b (2004), or the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, 
subd. 18c.  Although the topics are related, civil commitment implicates a host of 
different constitutional issues.  This Note focuses on prison-based treatment 
programs and does not discuss civil commitment.  A number of other articles 
provide an in-depth look at Minnesota’s civil commitment scheme.  See, e.g., Eric S. 
Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based 
Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083 (2003); Warren J. 
Maas, Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment of Sex Offenders, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL. L. REV. 1241 (2003); Anita Schlank & Rick Harry, Examining Our 
Approaches to Sex Offenders and the Law: The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex 
Offender in Minnesota: A Review of the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221 
(2003). 
 29. The Department of Corrections is under the control and supervision of 
the Commissioner of Corrections.  MINN. STAT. § 241.01, subd. 1. 
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treatment is ordered as a condition of probation.30  The 
Commissioner is required to provide a range of sex offender 
programs, including programs within the state adult correctional 
facility system.31  The Commissioner is empowered to establish rules 
and regulations for the treatment programs, and participation in 
the program is subject to those rules.32  The Commissioner is not 
required “to accept or retain an offender in a program if the 
offender . . . refuses or fails to comply with the program’s 
requirements.”33  Offenders do not have a statutory right to 
treatment.34 
Sex offenders entering one of the DOC facilities are 
immediately assessed to determine their programming needs.35  
The DOC’s largest prison-based treatment facility, located in MCF–
Lino Lakes, houses 225 adult males and services approximately 400 
offenders per year.36  The offenders are assessed for thirty days 
before being assigned to a therapeutic track.37  The goal of the 
program is “to help the offender reduce his risk of reoffending 
through acceptance of responsibility for his problems; acquisition 
of new information, cognitive and behavioral change; and 
development of a reoffense prevention plan and a community re-
entry plan.”38 
Most treatment providers agree that acceptance of 
responsibility is necessary for successful treatment and failure to do 
so is a serious obstacle to rehabilitation.39  Offenders are required 
to disclose all past offenses because development of an effective 
 
 30. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3-4. 
 31. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3(a). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 23, at 1.  The programs available 
include group therapy, chemical dependency programming, alternative 
programming for lower functioning inmates, transitional programming to prepare 
inmates for re-entry into society, aftercare programming for offenders continuing 
to serve their sentence, and post-release programming for offenders on supervised 
release.  Id. 
 36. Id.  The other facilities offering treatment are MCF–Willow River/Moose 
Lake for the highest risk male offenders (capacity 50), MCF–Shakopee for adult 
women (capacity 12), and MCF–Red Wing for juveniles (capacity 25).  Id. at 1-2. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224; see also ASS’N OF STATE CORR. 
ADMINISTRATORS’ PUBL’N, CORRECTIONAL BEST PRACTICES: DIRECTORS’ PERSPECTIVES 
(2000), http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Articles/article61.htm (discussing Ohio’s 
sex offender treatment program). 
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relapse prevention plan involves “a careful analysis of the thoughts, 
feelings and decisions which preceded past offenses.”40  From a 
clinical perspective, there is a benefit to encourage or push 
offenders to admit to their past offenses despite the offenders’ 
reluctance to do so, while at the same time giving them 
psychological support for overcoming their reluctance.41 
Consequently, an offender who refuses to admit or accept 
responsibility for past offenses is declared unamenable to treatment 
and is not accepted into the treatment program.42  While admitting 
past offenses may make sense from a treatment perspective,43 it may 
violate the offender’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.44 
B.   Minnesota’s Sentencing Statutes and the Commissioner’s Power to 
Extend an Inmate’s Supervised Release Date for Disciplinary Infractions 
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines45 were promulgated in 
1980 with the goal of establishing uniformity and proportionality in 
criminal sentencing.46  The Guidelines set a presumptive criminal 
 
 40. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 
24 (2002)). 
 41. Telephone Interview with Robin Goldman, MCF–Lino Lakes Sex 
Offender Treatment Program Director (Oct. 28, 2005).  Ms. Goldman likens this 
to teaching someone to jump off a high dive.  Id.  You push them from the top, 
but are there at the bottom to offer support and encouragement.  Id. 
 42. See, e.g., State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Minn. 
1999).  Morrow is discussed in detail in Part V.A. 
 43. See Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224. 
 44. See infra Part V. 
 45. The Guidelines were created and are reviewed annually by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, an on-going policy-making body created by 
the Minnesota Legislature in 1978.  See Act of April 15, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. 
Laws 761 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)); see also Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, What is the Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission?, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Text%20Only/what_are_the_ 
guidelines.htm#q2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
 46. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES pt. I, at 1 (2005).  The stated purpose of 
the Guidelines is to “establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which 
reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a 
felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent 
of the offender’s criminal history.”  Id.  In order to meet this goal, felons convicted 
of committing a crime in the typical fashion must receive the same sentence, and 
felons convicted of committing a crime in an atypical fashion must receive a 
different sentence.  Id.  Under the previous indeterminate sentencing scheme, the 
Legislature set the maximum sentence an inmate could serve based on his crime.  
The sentencing judge then had discretion to impose a sentence ranging from 
probation to the maximum allowed by the Legislature.  Parole boards also had 
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sentence based on the type of offense and the convicted felon’s 
criminal history score.47 
The offender is rarely incarcerated for the duration of the 
sentence.  Instead, the sentence consists of (1) a term of 
imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence, 
and (2) a supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the 
sentence.48  The supervised release term is a transitional phase that 
allows the offender to re-enter society under the supervision of 
state or county corrections agents.49  Supervised release may also be 
used as an incentive for the offender to behave while incarcerated, 
and the Commissioner may impose a “disciplinary confinement 
period”50 (also known as “disciplinary confinement time added” or 
DCTA) for violation of “any disciplinary rule adopted by the 
Commissioner.”51 
When an offender is sentenced, the judge is required to 
inform the offender of “(1) the total length of the executed 
sentence; (2) the amount of time the defendant will serve in 
prison; and (3) the amount of time the defendant will serve on 
supervised release, assuming the defendant commits no 
disciplinary offense in prison that results in the imposition of a 
[DCTA].”52  The judge must also explain that the Commissioner 
may extend the defendant’s incarceration time for the commission 
of disciplinary offenses which could result in the defendant being 
incarcerated for the entire sentence.53 
The Legislature has declared that refusal to participate in sex 
offender therapy is grounds for DCTA.54  This means that a sex 
 
discretion to release the inmate if he was deemed rehabilitated.  See Richard S. 
Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 (1993).  The 
Guidelines removed this discretion in favor of a more uniform sentencing 
approach.  Id. 
 47. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES pts. II, IV (2005); see also Frase, supra 
note 46, at 4. 
 48. MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1. 
 49. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 9 (2005), 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalrepor
t.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 244.05, subd. 1b. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 244.101, subd. 2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. § 241.67, subd. 3(a) (“Participation in [the SOTP program] is subject 
to the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections,” i.e., the DOC may 
impose DCTA for failure to comply with the program); see also State ex rel. Morrow 
v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999). 
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offender may be forced to choose between undergoing therapy—
which requires admitting the crime as the first step—or facing 
DCTA, resulting in a longer period of incarceration.55  It is this 
“Hobson’s choice” that gives rise to a potential violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.56 
III.  THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
A.   Brief History of the Right Against Self-Incrimination57 
Although evidence supporting recognition of the right against 
self-incrimination can be found as far back as Talmudic law, the 
modern-day right has its roots in English history.58  Following the 
Norman conquest of England, separate ecclesiastical courts were 
established to hear all cases of an ecclesiastical nature.59  The courts 
were inquisitorial, meaning the judge would summon the accused 
for secret examination.60 
The oath de veritate dicenda was first introduced to England in 
1236.61  It later became known as the oath ex officio because the 
judge was empowered to compel the oath by virtue of his office.62  
The ecclesiastical court would force the accused to take the oath, 
while he was ignorant of its meaning and before any formal charges 
were made, in order to uncover charges that could be leveled 
 
 55. See MINN. STAT. §§ 241.67, subd. 3(a), 244.05, subd. 1b(a). 
 56. The term “Hobson’s choice” means the choice of taking what is offered 
or nothing at all.  Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 864 (Jean L. 
McKechnie ed., 2d ed. 1983). 
 57. For a much more detailed historical analysis of the right against self-
incrimination, see LEVY, supra note 2 and Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored 
Relationship Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary 
Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992). 
 58. LEVY, supra note 2, at 433-35.  Levy writes that there was no such thing as a 
plea of guilty in Talmudic law.  Id. at 435.  No one would be permitted to confess 
to a crime or witness against himself, and any incriminating admission would 
simply be excluded.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 43.  The courts had criminal jurisdiction over offenses against 
religion such as blasphemy, sacrilege, and witchcraft.  They also had jurisdiction 
over issues less related to religion, such as sexual conduct, marriage, and wills.  Id. 
at 43-44. 
 60. Id. at 45. 
 61. Id. at 46.  It was brought to England by Cardinal Otho, legate of Pope 
Gregory IX, as part of procedural reforms to be followed by ecclesiastical courts.  
Id. 
 62. Id. 
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against him.63  It obligated the accused to give true answers to 
whatever questions were asked.64  Its purpose was to extract a 
confession,65 and a refusal to take the oath was regarded as 
evidence against the accused.66  Both the King and Parliament 
objected to the oath, but the ecclesiastical courts used it 
nevertheless.67 
Parliament abolished the oath in the seventeenth century and 
common law courts assumed jurisdiction from ecclesiastical courts 
over matters in which “life, liberty or property” were at stake.68  In 
the years that followed, an affirmative right to remain silent 
developed.69  Eventually, English common law recognized the right 
against self-incrimination both in court and when interrogated by 
an agency of the State.70 
The American colonies adopted England’s right against self-
incrimination.71  Then, following the Declaration of Independence 
in 1776, several states drafted state constitutions containing a right 
against self-incrimination.72  Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of 
 
 63. Id. at 46-47. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 47.  Obtaining a confession was important because it was often the 
only way to comply with the canon law’s requirement of “perfect or complete” 
proof.  Herman, supra note 57, at 109. 
 66. Herman, supra note 57, at 112. 
 67. See id. at 110.  In 1246, King Henry III forbade the use of the oath under 
most circumstances because he believed it was “contrary to ‘ancient Customs . . . 
[and] peoples Liberties.’”  Id.  In 1285 and again in 1316, Parliament ordered the 
courts to desist administering the oath.  Id. 
 68. Id. at 135-36.  This action was prompted by the trials of John Lilburne.  
Accused of sedition, Lilburne was willing to answer questions about the actual 
charges against him, but would not answer questions that he believed raised new 
matters.  Id. at 135.  Lilburne was held in contempt for refusing to take the oath 
and was put in the stocks, whipped, fined, and jailed.  Id. at 136.  He argued that 
the oath and self-accusation were against God’s law and the law of nature, and that 
he was being imprisoned for refusing to incriminate himself.  Id.  He gained 
popular support, eventually prevailed and was released from jail.  Id. 
 69. See id. at 137-38. 
 70. Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 2), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 
543 (1992). 
 71. LEVY, supra note 2, at 336.  Virginia, the first American colony, stated in its 
1606 charter that its citizens and their descendents would enjoy the same rights as 
those born in England.  Id.  These rights included trial by jury and any criminal 
procedural protections that existed in England.  Id.  Subsequent charters of other 
colonies included a similar guarantee.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 409.  The states included Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Vermont, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.  Id. at 
409-10. 
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Rights stated that “in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man . . . 
[cannot] be compelled to give evidence against himself.”73  This 
became a model for the Fifth Amendment.74 
B.   The Modern-Day Right Under the Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment states that “no [person] shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”75  
The right is a bedrock of our society.  The right against self-
incrimination 
reflects . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected of 
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or 
contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than 
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; . . . our sense of 
fair play which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government to leave the individual alone 
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by 
requiring the government in its contest with the 
individual to shoulder the entire load”; . . . our distrust of 
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the 
privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a 
protection to the innocent.76 
1.   When the Right Against Self-Incrimination Attaches 
In line with the policies listed above, the Fifth Amendment 
“privileges [an individual] not to answer official questions put to 
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings.”77  It applies to any situation where the one asserting 
the privilege has a rational fear that his statement could lead to 
prosecution.78 
The State may compel a witness to answer if it first grants 
 
 73. Id. at 405-06. 
 74. Id. at 409. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 76. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) 
(citations omitted). 
 77. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
 78. See id.; see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (“The 
privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which 
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal 
proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility 
him who gives it.”). 
11
Heim: Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't-Why Minnesota's Prison-base
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
16HEIM.DOC 4/5/2006  1:37:24 PM 
1228 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
immunity against use of the answers and evidence derived from 
them in any subsequent criminal case.79  If immunity was not 
granted, any compelled answers are not admissible in a later 
criminal proceeding.80 
2.   The General Requirement that the Right Must Be Affirmatively 
Asserted 
As a general rule, a person must assert the right against self-
incrimination in order to claim it.81  The Fifth Amendment is 
intended to protect a witness from government compulsion and 
therefore “does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in 
matters which may incriminate him.”82  A witness who fails to claim 
the right at the time of questioning will not be allowed to claim 
compulsion at a later date.83 
3.   When the Right Is Self-Executing: Custodial Interrogations and 
Penalty Situations 
There are, however, certain situations in which the right 
becomes self-executing and the witness’ failure to assert the 
privilege is excused.84  These situations involve circumstances where 
“the individual [was denied] a ‘free choice to admit, to deny, or to 
refuse to answer.’”85  An example is found in custodial 
 
 79. Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); see also Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976) (“[I]n the ordinary case, if a witness under 
compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the 
government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.”) 
 82. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984). 
 83. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); see also United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970).  In Kordel, a corporate officer who had been 
notified of contemplated criminal action against him nevertheless proceeded to 
provide incriminating answers to interrogatories posed in a civil case.  397 U.S. at 
3-6.  The Court concluded that “his failure . . . to assert the constitutional privilege 
leaves him in no position to complain now that he was compelled to give testimony 
against himself.”  Id. at 10. 
 84. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-30. 
 85. Garner, 424 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 
(1941)).  The policy behind the self-incrimination clause being triggered when a 
witness fears his answers may lead to criminal charges is that “‘[t]he natural 
concern which underlies [these] decisions is that an inability to protect the right 
at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.’”  
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974)).  The same policy applies to non-
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interrogations.86  Coercion is assumed in custodial interrogation 
settings because they contain “inherently compelling pressures 
which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to 
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”87 
A penalty situation occurs when a person is forced to decide 
between facing a penalty for asserting his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination or avoiding the penalty by incriminating 
himself.88  The Supreme Court has stated in a line of cases that a 
State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects 
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to not give incriminating 
testimony about himself.89  Examples of impermissible penalties 
that were substantial enough to trigger the right against self-
incrimination include loss of employment;90 loss of the license to 
practice law;91 ineligibility to receive government contracts, 
resulting in a reduced ability to earn a living;92 and loss of ability to 
hold public office and to participate in political groups.93  In all of 
these cases, the penalties faced by the defendants for refusing to 
incriminate themselves were so severe that it caused the defendants 
to succumb to the pressure, coercion was assumed, and the right 
against self-incrimination was self-executing.94 
 
criminal proceedings. 
 86. See, e.g., Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-34. 
 87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  Miranda was the first case 
to extend Fifth Amendment rights to in-custody interrogation situations.  Id.  
Miranda recognized inherent compulsion to speak exists when an individual is 
interrogated in police custody.  Id.  Therefore, any statements are presumed to 
have been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment unless the State can 
prove that the individual made the statement freely and with full awareness of his 
rights.  See id. at 478. 
 88. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434.  Failure to assert the right against self-
incrimination is also excused “where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so 
as to ‘foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and . . . compe[l] . . . 
incriminating testimony.’”  Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661 
(1976)). 
 89. See infra notes 90-93. 
 90. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 
(1968). 
 91. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). 
 92. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
 93. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). 
 94. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
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IV.  UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO SEX 
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
A.   Minnesota v. Murphy 
In 1980, Donald Murphy was charged with criminal sexual 
conduct but was sentenced to three years probation when he 
pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of false imprisonment.95  One of 
the terms of his probation required participation in sexual 
offender treatment offered by Alpha House.96  After Murphy 
abandoned his treatment program, the treatment counselor 
informed his probation officer that Murphy admitted raping and 
murdering a teenage girl in 1974.97  Upon meeting with his 
probation officer, Murphy admitted to the rape and murder.98  He 
was arrested and indicted for first-degree murder.99 
Murphy argued that the use of his confession at trial would 
violate his Fifth Amendment rights.100  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court agreed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
issue of “whether a statement made by a probationer to his 
probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding.”101 
The Court ruled that Murphy’s privilege against self-
incrimination was not violated because, under the circumstances, 
he was not compelled to incriminate himself.102  However, the 
Court stated two principles that have direct bearing on the issue of 
sex offenders.  First, a defendant does not lose his Fifth 
Amendment rights by virtue of conviction of a crime.103  Second, 
the State threatening to revoke an individual’s probation for 
 
 95. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422 (1984).  He was sentenced to a 
term of sixteen months, but the sentence was suspended subject to his probation.  
Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 423.  Murphy had been questioned about the incident twice before 
in 1974, but never charged.  Id. at 422. 
 98. Id. at 424. 
 99. Id. at 424-25. 
 100. Id. at 425. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 440.  Although Murphy was required by the terms of his probation 
to answer the probation officer truthfully, that did not preclude him from refusing 
to make self-incriminating statements.  Therefore, it would have been 
unreasonable for Murphy to believe that invoking his Fifth Amendment rights 
would have resulted in his probation being revoked.  Id. at 438. 
 103. Id. at 426; see also Baxter v. Palmigniano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976). 
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refusing to incriminate himself would create the classic penalty 
situation, and his statements would not be admissible against him 
at trial.104 
B.   McKune v. Lile 
1.   Facts in McKune 
In McKune v. Lile,105 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Kansas law requiring convicted sex offenders 
to complete a treatment program.106  Robert Lile was accused of 
sexually assaulting a high school student on her way home from 
school.107  Although he claimed the act was consensual, he was 
convicted and sentenced to prison.108 
Prison officials ordered Lile to participate in a Sexual Abuse 
Treatment Program (SATP) a few years before his scheduled 
release date.109  The two requirements of the program were that he 
(1) admit to and accept responsibility for the crime for which he 
was convicted and (2) complete a sexual history form detailing all 
past charged and uncharged criminal offenses.110  Although the 
information was used primarily to aid rehabilitation, it was not 
privileged, and Kansas left open the possibility that the statements 
would be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.111 
Prison officials informed Lile that his privilege status would be 
reduced from Level III to Level I if he refused to participate in the 
program.112  Some of the benefits a Level III inmate enjoyed 
included enhanced visitation rights, the ability to earn up to 
minimum wage, the ability to send money home to family, and a 
 
 104. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.  “There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for 
concluding that if the state, either expressly or by implication, asserts that 
invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have 
created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be 
excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.”  Id. 
 105. 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
 106. Id. at 29. 
 107. Id. at 29-30. 
 108. Id. at 30.  Lile was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated 
kidnapping.  Id.  The opinion does not state the length of his prison term.  See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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cell shared with one other inmate rather than four.113 
Lile argued that being forced to choose between admitting to 
sexual assault and having his status reduced to Level I imposed 
impermissible penalties upon him and thus violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.114  The United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas entered summary judgment 
in his favor115 and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed.116 
2.   The Plurality and Dissenting Opinions 
A plurality117 of the Court ruled that the reduction in status was 
not a penalty, and therefore Lile’s rights were not violated.118  The 
plurality based its opinion on the premise that prison officials were 
free to move prisoners to other facilities for any reason.119  The 
Court previously ruled that “challenged prison conditions cannot 
give rise to a due process violation unless those conditions 
constitute ‘atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”120  Therefore, 
because the Commissioner could move Lile to another prison unit 
at will, the Court reasoned that the loss of benefits that 
accompanied the move was not a penalty for purposes of self-
incrimination.121 
 
 113. Id. at 63-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also pointed to the 
fact that reduction from Level III to Level I is typically reserved for serious 
disciplinary infractions, such as committing a felony, theft, sodomy, arson, and 
assault.  Id. at 63 n.8. 
 114. Id. at 31. 
 115. Lile v. McKune, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1164 (D. Kan. 1998).  The court 
reasoned that he would subject himself to perjury since he testified at trial that the 
act was consensual.  Id. at 1157 n.8. 
 116. Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000).  The court of 
appeals ruled that reduction in prison privileges and housing accommodations 
was a penalty.  Id. at 1189. 
 117. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.  McKune, 536 U.S. 24 at 29.  Justice O’Connor 
concurred in the result.  Id. at 48-54 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. at 45-46. 
 119. Id. at 44.  Prison administrators are free to transfer inmates to a different 
prison even if “life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another.”  
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause). 
 120. McKune, 536 U.S. at 37 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995)).  Although Sandin involves due process violations, the Court stated that 
Sandin’s reasoning is analogous to a self-incrimination claim.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 44.  Although the defendant, Lile, “would prefer not to choose 
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After ruling that there was no constitutional violation, the 
plurality was free to balance Kansas’s legitimate interests in 
rehabilitating sex offenders with incidental “burdens [on] an 
inmate’s right to remain silent.”122  The plurality also reasoned that 
the State’s interest in rehabilitation must be “weighed against the 
exercise of an inmate’s liberty”123 and an inmate who accepts 
responsibility for the crime is more likely to be rehabilitated.124  
Finally, the plurality was concerned that a ruling in favor of Lile 
would call the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines into question, because 
they allow for downward adjustment of a sentence when the 
offender accepts responsibility for the crime.125  However, while 
these are valid concerns, they are subordinate to the Constitution 
and would not survive if Kansas’s SATP program had been found 
unconstitutional. 
The dissent argued vigorously that the SATP program was not 
taking away benefits, but was instead penalizing inmates for 
refusing to incriminate themselves.126  The dissent also pointed out 
that even if the change in Lile’s status could be characterized as a 
loss of benefits to which he had no entitlement, the question is not 
whether he was entitled to them in the first place, but whether 
taking them away now constitutes a penalty for asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights.127 
3.  Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is the most important part of 
the opinion because although she agreed with the plurality’s 
outcome, she did not agree with its analysis.  She was troubled by its 
 
between losing prison privileges and accepting responsibility for his past crimes,” it 
is a choice “that does not amount to compulsion, and therefore one Kansas may 
require [Lile] to make.”  Id. at 45. 
 122. Id. at 41. 
 123. Id. at 36. 
 124. Id. at 36-37.  “Acceptance of responsibility . . . demonstrates that an 
offender ‘is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional 
system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a 
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.’”  Id. (citing Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)). 
 125. Id. at 47 (citing section 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual). 
 126. Id. at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 66.  The dissent pointed out that it took Lile several years to acquire 
the living status he enjoyed at the time he was ordered to participate in the SATP 
program.  Id. at 62. 
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“failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”128  More 
specifically, Justice O’Connor did not agree that the “atypical and 
significant hardship” standard is broad enough to evaluate whether 
a prisoner has been compelled to incriminate himself.129  Instead, 
she believes the test should be “whether the pressure imposed . . . 
rises to a level where it is likely to ‘compel’ a person ‘to be a witness 
against himself.’”130 
Unlike the plurality, Justice O’Connor would apply the 
“penalty case” analysis to this situation, which would require 
determining whether the consequence faced by the individual 
refusing to incriminate himself was an impermissible penalty.131  
O’Connor felt the changes in living conditions Lile faced were too 
minor to “compel his testimony.”132  However, she did state that 
longer incarceration is a penalty far greater than those already 
found unconstitutional in the penalty cases, and its “imposition . . . 
for refusing to incriminate oneself would surely implicate a ‘liberty 
interest.’”133 
The Court in McKune did not establish a self-incrimination test 
to apply in the prison context because it could not agree that the 
change in Lile’s living conditions were severe enough penalties to 
trigger the right against self-incrimination.  However, if Lile had 
faced extended incarceration for refusing to incriminate himself, it 
appears that Justice O’Connor would have joined the dissent and 
created a majority that would have found it to be an impermissible 
penalty.134  In fact, even the plurality opinion suggested that an 
extension of Lile’s incarceration term or ineligibility for good time 
credits would have affected the analysis.135  This is important to 
keep in mind when considering Minnesota’s law. 
 
 128. Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. at 48-49. 
 130. Id. at 49. 
 131. See id. at 49-50. 
 132. Id. at 51-52. 
 133. Id. at 52. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 43. 
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V.   MINNESOTA CASE LAW RELATING TO SEX OFFENDERS 
A.   State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur 
1.   Facts of the Case 
State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur is Minnesota’s leading case on 
the issue of requiring admission of a crime in prison-based therapy.  
Randy Morrow was convicted in 1996 of fourth-degree criminal 
sexual conduct against a thirteen-year-old boy.136  Morrow had 
employed the boy, and other boys, to assist him with his paper 
route.137  The children spent much time at his house and often 
spent the night.138  Morrow testified at trial that he showed his 
affection to the boys by hugging and kissing them and giving them 
backrubs.139  The complainant, N.F., testified that on two occasions 
Morrow touched N.F.’s buttocks, which Morrow denied.140  The jury 
found Morrow guilty and he was sentenced to thirty-six months of 
imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.141 
Morrow was committed to the Commissioner of Corrections 
and underwent sex offender assessment at the Minnesota 
Correctional Facility at Stillwater.142  The prison psychologist 
informed Morrow that the purpose of the interview was to 
determine the most appropriate SOTP and that failure to complete 
the program could result in additional incarceration time.143  
Morrow cooperated in the interview by discussing and admitting 
some parts of the offense.144  However, he denied touching N.F.’s 
buttocks, the element of sexual contact.145  He also denied 
 
 136. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 789.  Minnesota Statutes section 609.345, 
subdivision 1(b) (1998) states that a person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in 
the fourth degree if they engage in sexual conduct with someone between the ages 
of thirteen and sixteen, and are more than forty-eight months older than the 
person.  Consent is not a defense.  Id.  Mistake must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. 
 137. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 789. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 790. 
 145. Id. 
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responsibility for the offense and was unremorseful.146  Morrow was 
transferred to Lino Lakes to begin long-term intensive sex offender 
treatment.147 
Morrow was assessed once again at Lino Lakes, where he 
admitted to all actions of his offense except for touching N.F.’s 
buttocks.148  Morrow gave three reasons for his denials.  First, he 
denied that his actions were inappropriate, harmful, or criminal.149  
Second, he refused to admit to the offense because he was in the 
process of appealing his conviction and feared that an admission 
would damage his appeal.150  Third, Morrow had testified in his 
defense at trial and feared prosecution for perjury if he admitted to 
the offense.151 
The treatment staff determined that Morrow would not benefit 
from treatment and discharged him from the program.152  As a 
result, Morrow was assessed ninety days DCTA, and his release date 
was extended from January 22, 1998, to April 22, 1998.153 
2.   The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision 
The district court denied Morrow’s habeas corpus petition, 
and he appealed.154  The court of appeals found significant the fact 
that Morrow had not exhausted his right to appeal.155  The court 
stated that “the ‘better rule’ is that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination ‘continues until . . . the 
conviction has been affirmed on appeal.’”156  The court also ruled 
that requiring an admission of guilt before being allowed to enter 
the treatment program was too restrictive.157 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 790-91.  Morrow’s conviction was subsequently affirmed on appeal.  
State v. Morrow, No. C4-96-1702, 1997 WL 309453, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 
1997).  That fact, however, as the court of appeals noted in deciding that Morrow’s 
right against self-incrimination was violated, is irrelevant because the appeal was 
pending at the time Morrow was being assessed for treatment.  See State ex rel. 
Morrow v. LaFleur, 577 N.W.2d 226, 228 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 151. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 227. 
 155. Id. at 228. 
 156. Id. at 227 (quoting United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 
1991)). 
 157. Id. at 228.  The court distinguished Morrow’s case from Taylor v. Lieffort, 
20
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The court of appeals stated that Morrow’s termination from 
the treatment program made treatment “a punishment for an 
exercise of [Morrow’s] rights rather than an opportunity for 
rehabilitation.”158  The court also held that imposing DCTA because 
Morrow refused to admit guilt before entering the treatment 
program resulted in him “being punished immediately and directly 
for his failure to (fully) admit guilt” rather than making failure one 
factor in the ultimate decision of whether he successfully 
completed treatment.159  The court of appeals ruled that Morrow’s 
Fifth Amendment rights were violated and ruled that he must be 
released on his original release date.160 
3.   The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review on the issue of 
“whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
prohibits the Department of Corrections from making a finding of 
unamenability to treatment when that finding is based . . . on the 
inmate’s assertion that truthful cooperation with treatment could 
subject him to criminal liability.”161  The court reversed the court of 
appeals, holding that Morrow’s rights were not violated.162 
The court’s analysis focused on whether the Commissioner’s 
power to impose disciplinary time on Morrow was a sufficient 
compulsion to trigger Morrow’s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.163  In doing so, the court focused on the nature 
of the compulsion: the choice between participating in mandated 
sex offender treatment—which includes admission of the convicted 
offense—or having his sentence extended as discipline for failure 
 
568 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), which involved a similar set of 
circumstances.  There, the court held that a requirement of admission of guilt 
before Taylor, an inmate, could be admitted to sex offender treatment did not 
violate his Fifth Amendment rights.  See Taylor, 568 N.W.2d at 458-59.  The court of 
appeals, in Morrow, distinguished Taylor on two grounds.  First, Taylor had already 
exhausted his appeals.  Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228.  Second, Taylor refused to 
participate in treatment, but Morrow only refused to make certain admissions.  Id.  
 158. Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228. 
 159. Id.  The court cited In re Welfare of J.G.W, 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn. 
1989), for the proposition that while the court could not require someone to 
incriminate themselves, it could require treatment for which acceptance of guilt is 
necessary for successful completion of therapy.  See Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228. 
 160. Morrow, 577 N.W.2d at 228.   
 161. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Minn. 1999). 
 162. Id. at 796. 
 163. Id. at 792. 
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to complete treatment.164  The court reasoned that this did not rise 
to the level of compulsion found in the penalty cases and 
determined that Morrow’s rights were not violated.165 
Key to the decision was the court’s distinction between being 
released from prison before the end of one’s sentence and “losing 
one’s freedom when . . . not serving a sentence.”166  The court 
interpreted Minnesota’s sentencing statutes as not guaranteeing a 
“specific, minimum length of a supervised release term,”167 but that 
a supervised release date is conditional upon participation in a 
SOTP.168  The court wrote: 
In the plainest of terms, when Morrow received a 36-
month sentence, those 36 months belonged 
presumptively to the state.  Reducing the part of the 36-
month sentence that is to be spent on supervised release is 
not a penalty of such magnitude that it is comparable to 
those detailed in the Supreme Court’s so-called “penalty” 
cases.169 
Once the court determined that Morrow did not have a 
fundamental right to supervised release, it reasoned that society’s 
interest in releasing sex offenders in a treated state outweighed 
Morrow’s interests in refusing to incriminate himself.170 
In his dissent, Justice Page (joined by Justice Paul Anderson) 
argued that Morrow’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated 
because he was penalized as a direct result of his refusal to 
incriminate himself while his appeal was pending.171  “The simple 
solution to this problem,” he stated, “is for the [S]tate to grant 
Morrow immunity for any incriminating statements” that would 
affect his appeal.172 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 794-96 & n.13. 
 166. Id. at 793; see also State v. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999). 
 167. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3 
(1998)). 
 168. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1 (1998)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 795-96.  The court also distinguished between invoking one’s Fifth 
Amendment right and the State’s ability to require answers to official questions.  
Id. at 795. 
 171. Id. at 796-97 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 798.  This argument is not new.  See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 
78 (1973); see also supra Part III.B.1. 
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B.   State v. Kaquatosh 
State v. Kaquatosh,173 decided by the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals shortly after Morrow, ruled that the threatened loss of 
probation is a sufficient liberty interest to trigger one’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.174  Mike Kaquatosh 
was found guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.175  As 
part of the pre-sentence investigation, the trial judge ordered 
Kaquatosh to submit to an assessment to determine his need for 
sex-offender treatment.176  Kaquatosh went to the assessment, but 
denied all of the allegations in the complaint and was deemed 
unamenable to treatment.177 
The judge stayed Kaquatosh’s twenty-one year prison sentence 
and instead put him on probation for ten years.178  One condition 
of his probation was that he successfully complete a treatment 
program and “denial of [the] offenses [was] not acceptable as 
reasons why [Kaquatosh was] not accepted into a treatment 
program.”179 
Kaquatosh initiated an appeal of his conviction.180  His defense 
attorney recommended that he cooperate with the treatment but 
assert his Fifth Amendment right when questioned about the facts 
underlying the conviction.181  Kaquatosh followed these 
recommendations and agreed to participate in treatment but 
refused to admit to the crime.182  He was again deemed 
inappropriate for treatment and was arrested for violating his 
parole.183  At the parole hearing, Kaquatosh argued that his Fifth 
 
 173. 600 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 174. Id. at 158.  Kaquatosh was decided by the court of appeals and therefore its 
value as precedent is much lower than Morrow.  Nevertheless, it does illustrate how 
Minnesota courts interpret Morrow and Murphy, as well as the uncertainty 
surrounding this issue. 
 175. Id. at 154. 
 176. Id. at 154-55.  The trial court must order convicted sex offenders to 
undergo assessment as part of a pre-sentence investigation unless the sentencing 
guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence or an adequate assessment was 
conducted prior to the conviction.  MINN. STAT. § 609.3457, subd. 1 (2004). 
 177. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d at 155. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 154. 
 181. Id. at 155. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  The treatment provider recommended that he wait until after his 
appeal to participate in the program.  Id. 
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Amendment rights were being violated.184  The judge rejected the 
argument and executed the prison sentence.185 
The court of appeals, relying heavily upon Morrow and Murphy, 
reversed the decision.186  Although the Morrow court ruled that a 
delay in Morrow’s supervised release date did not rise to the level of 
compulsion necessary to trigger his right against self-incrimination, 
the court did state that revocation of probation would be 
sufficient.187  Likewise, the Supreme Court in Murphy stated that the 
threatened loss of parole would create “the classic penalty 
situation.”188  The court of appeals ruled that revoking Kaquatosh’s 
probation impermissibly penalized him for asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights.189  Therefore, the State could not compel 
Kaquatosh to incriminate himself as part of the treatment program, 
and revocation of his probation was unconstitutional.190 
C.  Carrillo v. Fabian 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s 
sentencing statutes in Carrillo v. Fabian191 turns Morrow on its head 
by coming to an exactly opposite conclusion regarding an inmate’s 
liberty interest in his supervised release date.  Richard Carrillo, an 
inmate at the Faribault prison serving a 114-month sentence for a 
drive-by shooting, was accused of disorderly conduct and assault of 
an inmate because a prison guard claimed she saw him shove 
another inmate to the ground.192  The prison guard was the only 
witness to testify against Carrillo at his disciplinary hearing, and 
although she could not see his face when the altercation occurred, 
she testified that it was him.193  Carrillo and two other inmates 
 
 184. Id. at 156.  Kaquatosh was willing to participate in treatment but his 
defense attorney advised him not to do so.  Id. at 155.  His predicament is 
illustrated in his statement: “So what do I do, jeopardize my Fifth Amendment in 
doing this when [the defense attorney] advises me not to?  Which road do I take?”  
Id. at 156. 
 185. Id. at 157-58. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 157 (citing State ex rel Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792-93 
(Minn. 1999)). 
 188. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984)). 
 189. Id. at 158. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 701 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2005). 
 192. Id. at 766-67. 
 193. Id. at 767. 
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testified that he did not commit the offense.194  Nevertheless, the 
hearing officer, relying on the “some evidence” standard of proof 
applied in prison disciplinary hearings, ruled that Carrillo 
committed the offense.195  As a result, Carrillo served twenty-three 
days in segregation, and his supervised release date was delayed by 
seven days.196  Carrillo’s writ of habeas corpus was denied by the 
district court and court of appeals.197  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court, however, ruled that extending Carrillo’s incarceration 
violated his right to due process.198 
The first issue the court decided, and the key issue with respect 
to the self-incrimination analysis, was whether Minnesota’s 
sentencing scheme creates a liberty interest in an inmate’s 
supervised release date.199  This was essentially the same issue the 
court addressed in Morrow, but this time the court came to the 
opposite conclusion.200  Rather than ruling that an inmate’s entire 
sentence presumptively belongs to the State, the court ruled that 
an inmate has a statutory right to his supervised release date unless 
he commits an offense while in prison.201 
In Sandin v. Connor,202 the Supreme Court established the 
“nature of the deprivation” test, which looks not at strict statutory 
language but “the nature of the deprivation and the extent to 
which that deprivation departs from the basic conditions of [the 
inmate’s] sentence.”203  With this test in mind, the court considered 
Carrillo’s claim with regard to Minnesota’s sentencing system. 
The court noted that when Carrillo was sentenced, he was told, 
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 244.101, that he would 
serve two-thirds of his sentence in prison and the remaining time 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  Minnesota Department of Corrections Policy 303.010, H, requires 
only “some evidence in the record to support the charged violation of the 
offender disciplinary regulations.”  Id. 
 196. Id. at 768. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. at 777. 
 199. Id. at 768. 
 200. See supra Part V.A.3.  Compare Carillo, 701 N.W.2d at 777, with State ex rel 
Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Minn. 1999). 
 201. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 773. 
 202. 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 203. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 771.  Sandin dealt with disciplinary segregation.  
The Court ruled that segregation involved only the conditions under which the 
inmate served time while in prison and, because it did not “inevitably affect” the 
duration of the inmate’s sentence, it was not a departure from the basic conditions 
of the sentence.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 487. 
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on supervised release, but that prison time could be extended if he 
committed a disciplinary offense.204  The court reasoned that under 
this sentencing scheme, an extension of incarceration is a 
departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sentence.  It 
stated: 
[I]t is precisely because Minnesota’s statutory scheme sets 
up an ordered, standardized, clearly delineated system—
under which an inmate will be released from prison on the 
date that he was informed by the judge at sentencing that 
he would be released unless he commits a disciplinary 
offense—that the extension of Carrillo’s supervised release 
date represents a departure from the basic conditions of 
his sentence.205 
The court recognized that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme also 
contains a provision that declares “[n]otwithstanding the court’s 
explanation of the potential length of a defendant’s supervised 
release term, the court’s explanation creates no right . . . to any 
specific, minimum length of a supervised release term.”206  The 
court reasoned that a literal interpretation of this provision would 
allow the Commissioner to extend an inmate’s supervised release 
date for any reason whatsoever, thus rendering the previous 
provisions useless.207  To harmonize the provisions, the court 
concluded that there is a difference between a “liberty interest” and 
a “right” to supervised release.208  This interpretation would allow 
the Commissioner to extend the supervised release date if the 
inmate commits a violation, but would guard the inmate against 
unjustified extensions by granting him the right to protect his 
liberty interest in his release date.209 
The court reversed the appellate court’s decision and 
Carrillo’s original supervised release date was reinstated.210  The 
important rule is that “any extension of an inmate’s period of 
imprisonment represents a significant departure from the basic 
conditions of the inmate’s sentence.”211  Therefore, under 
 
 204. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 771 (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subds. 1-2). 
 205. Id. at 772 n.6. 
 206. Id. at 773 (alteration in original) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3 
(2004)). 
 207. Id. at 773 n.7. 
 208. Id. at 773. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 777. 
 211. Id. at 773. 
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Minnesota’s sentencing scheme, any disciplinary sanction that “as 
an immediate consequence” extends an inmate’s supervised release 
date triggers a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.212 
VI.  UNCERTAINTY BREWING IN MINNESOTA’S SEX OFFENDER 
TREATMENT PROGRAM 
Morrow was based on the “important distinction . . . between 
being released from prison earlier than the time ordered in one’s 
sentence and losing one’s freedom when one is not serving a 
sentence.”213  Because Morrow’s time “belonged presumptively to 
the state,” an extension of his supervised release date could not 
possibly have been a penalty for purposes of self-incrimination.214  
But this distinction is contradicted by Carrillo’s recognition of a 
prisoner’s liberty interest in his supervised release date.215  
Accordingly, Carrillo leaves Minnesota’s SOTP in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
A.   Distinguishing Between Due Process and Fifth Amendment Violation 
Analyses 
Morrow and Carrillo were decided on different constitutional 
doctrines: Morrow’s under the Fifth Amendment and Carrillo’s 
under Due Process.  But this does not change Carrillo’s effect on 
Minnesota’s treatment program for two reasons.  First, the 
difference between governmental actions giving rise to Due Process 
violations and government-created penalties triggering the right 
against self-incrimination is hazy and, if anything, the Fifth 
Amendment standard is easier to meet.216  According to Justice 
 
 212. Id.  It is interesting to note that Carrillo was written by Justice Paul H. 
Anderson, who had joined Justice Page’s Morrow dissent.  Chief Justice Blatz, who 
was in the Morrow majority and authored the Carrillo dissent, was the only other 
justice to have served on the court during the Morrow decision.  Chronological List 
of Justices and Judges of the Minnesota Appellate Courts, 
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).  It is 
likely that the change in the court’s make-up played a role in the different 
interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing statutes. 
 213. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Minn. 1999). 
 214. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 3 (1998)); see also supra Part V.A.3. 
 215. See supra Part V.C. 
 216. For example, the McKune plurality found Sandin’s due process analysis “a 
useful instruction” in dealing with the self-incrimination issue.  McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24, 25 (2002) (citing Sandin v. Connor 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  
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O’Connor, the self-incrimination standard is even easier to 
establish because “the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is 
broader than the ‘atypical and significant hardship’ standard we 
have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons.”217  And 
the Morrow majority agreed with Justice Page’s statement that 
“[t]he absence of a substantive due process claim does not 
necessarily mean that the sanction imposed is not compulsion in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”218  Therefore, because 
Minnesota’s sentencing scheme created a due process right for 
Carrillo, it was surely capable of creating a coercive penalty 
situation for Morrow. 
Second, both Morrow and Carrillo hinged on the court’s 
interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing scheme, not on different 
constitutional claims.  In other words, the first hurdle both Morrow 
and Carrillo needed to overcome—irrespective of their underlying 
constitutional claim—was that Minnesota’s sentencing scheme 
granted them an interest in their scheduled supervised release 
date. 
For example, the court in Morrow focused first on Minnesota’s 
sentencing statutes in determining that Morrow did not have an 
interest in his supervised release date, thus paving the way for its 
decision that Morrow was not being penalized for asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights.219  Likewise, in Carrillo the court stated that the 
first step in a due process analysis was to determine whether the 
State was interfering with an individual’s liberty interest.220  This 
also meant determining whether Carrillo had a liberty interest in 
his supervised release date, which was the same basic question as in 
Morrow.221  Therefore, the fact that the two cases were decided on 
different constitutional doctrines does not change Carrillo’s effect 
on a sex offender’s right against self-incrimination. 
B.   Applying McKune and Murphy Through the Carrillo Lens 
The constitutional implications of the Carrillo decision on 
 
“[Sandin] may not provide a precise parallel for determining whether there is 
compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide useful instruction for answering 
the latter inquiry.”  Id. at 25. 
 217. Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 
 218. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793 n.10, 798 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 219. See id. at 793. 
 220. Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005). 
 221. Id. 
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Minnesota’s SOTP are undeniable.  With the court’s recognition of 
a liberty interest in an offender’s supervised release date, the State 
can no longer rely on Morrow when determining that offenders are 
unamenable to treatment simply because they refuse to make 
incriminating statements. 
As already discussed above, had the court recognized the 
liberty interest at the time of Morrow, the decision would almost 
certainly have gone the other way; once the court established that 
Morrow had no right to a supervised release date, it logically 
followed that he was not being impermissibly penalized for his 
refusal to incriminate himself.222  If, however, Morrow had a liberty 
interest in his supervised release date (as recognized in Carrillo223) 
and his full sentence did not “belong[] presumptively to the 
State,”224 then extending his supervised release date would have 
been a “substantial penalty for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.”225 
United States Supreme Court precedent compels the same 
conclusion.  Although the Court in McKune did not find a Fifth 
Amendment violation under the facts of that case, Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence,226 the dissent,227 and even the plurality 
opinion228 all state that an extension of incarceration time would be 
a penalty sufficient to trigger the right against self-incrimination.  
Morrow faced longer incarceration in the form of DCTA for 
refusing to incriminate himself.229  It is quite plausible that under 
the McKune reasoning the Supreme Court would have found this to 
be an impermissible penalty by itself.  However, it is even more 
likely that the Supreme Court would find an impermissible penalty 
 
 222. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793; see also supra Part V.A.3. 
 223. See supra Part V.C. 
 224. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 793. 
 225. Id. 
 226. The penalty of “longer incarceration . . . [is] far greater than those we 
have already held to constitute unconstitutional compulsion in the penalty cases.  
Indeed, the imposition of such [an] outcome[] as a penalty for refusing to 
incriminate oneself would surely implicate a ‘liberty interest.’”  McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24, 52 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 227. The dissent argued that Lile’s loss of benefits while in prison implicated a 
liberty interest.  See id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Undoubtedly, the dissent 
would have agreed that longer incarceration would also implicate a liberty 
interest. 
 228. “In the present case, [Lile’s] decision not to participate in the Kansas 
SATP did not extend his term of incarceration.  Nor did his decision affect his 
eligibility for good-time credits or parole.”  Id. at 38. 
 229. Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 791. 
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when the State threatens to take away a recognized liberty interest. 
The Supreme Court’s rule in Murphy (and the court of 
appeals’ decision in Kaquatosh as persuasive authority) supports the 
idea that requiring a sex offender to admit his crime violates the 
Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court stated in Murphy that 
threatened loss of parole is a sufficiently severe penalty to invoke 
the right against self-incrimination.230  Parole is different from a 
future supervised release date because the parolee has liberty now, 
while the inmate has an interest in future liberty.  However, Carrillo 
blurs the distinction between the two by recognizing an actual 
liberty interest in supervised release.  Extending an offender’s 
release date prolongs incarceration and is in essence a denial of his 
future liberty.231 
Carrillo’s interpretation of Minnesota’s sentencing scheme has 
placed Minnesota’s SOTP in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  
Incarcerated offenders, just like parolees, now have a recognized 
liberty interest in their supervised release date.232  The State violates 
the Fifth Amendment when it threatens to interfere with either 
interest simply because the offender invokes his right against self-
incrimination. 
VII.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Society has an undeniable interest in rehabilitating sex 
offenders before they are released from prison.233  Constitutional 
challenges to Minnesota’s SOTP can be minimized and even 
eliminated by structuring the program to avoid penalty situations.  
Potential solutions include (1) utilizing treatment programs that 
do not require admission of the offense, (2) beginning treatment 
after all appeals have been exhausted, (3) granting immunity to 
statements made in therapy, and (4) changing sentencing laws by 
legislative action. 
 
 230. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984). 
 231. The Carrillo court recognized that “seven days of additional incarceration 
time may not appear long relative to two-thirds of a 114-month sentence,” 
however, “any extension of an inmate’s period of imprisonment represents a 
significant departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sentence” and is 
worthy of the Constitution’s protections.  Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773 
(Minn. 2005). 
 232. See id.; see also Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. 
 233. See supra Part II. 
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A.   Utilize Treatment Programs Not Requiring an Admission of Guilt 
The conventional view of most therapists is that the offender’s 
denial of the crime must be overcome in order for the treatment to 
be effective,234 and most courts believe that acceptance of 
responsibility is necessary for rehabilitation.235  There are, however, 
alternatives that would allow an offender to participate without first 
admitting to the crime. 
In one such method, known as “metaconfrontation,” the 
therapist “aims to induce eventual acceptance of responsibility by 
expressing empathy for the offender’s initial need to deny [the 
offense].”236  The program is designed for offenders who are “most 
vulnerable and dependent on their defenses”237 and “encourages 
the offender to use his strengths to confront his own weaknesses, 
those parts of him that want to protect and deny.”238 
A second option, the “Schlank and Shaw method,” was created 
“as an intermediary step for offenders who are removed from 
traditional treatment programs for absolute refusal to admit 
responsibility for their behavior.”239  The program is designed to 
teach offenders about the “protective function of denial and elicit 
empathy for victims.”240  The offenders are asked to apply what they 
learn about denial to someone who is guilty of the same offense.241  
By doing this, the offender confronts the effects of denial without 
being required to admit the offense.242  This method was proven to 
be fairly successful when it was used on ten offenders and resulted 
in five of them admitting to their offense.243 
Treatment professionals are best equipped to decide what 
therapy methods to use.  However, given that Minnesota’s SOTP is 
open to constitutional attack, it may be worth considering other 
solutions other than what is being done today.  Providing 
alternative treatment programs for offenders who are unwilling to 
 
 234. Kaden, supra note 10, at 367; see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying 
text. 
 235. Kaden, supra note 10, at 369. 
 236. Id. at 370. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 370-71. 
 239. Id. at 371-72.  The program is named after its creators, Anita Schlank and 
Theodore Shaw.  Id. at 371. 
 240. Id. at 371. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 372. 
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admit responsibility for the crime would be the best way to avoid a 
penalty situation.  The Fifth Amendment violation would be 
eliminated.  Furthermore, offenders who are traditionally 
considered unamenable to treatment would receive a form of 
therapy that they are able to handle.  This modification would most 
likely result in a larger number of offenders receiving some form of 
treatment because in virtually all of the cases discussed above the 
offender refused to admit guilt, but did not refuse to participate in 
treatment altogether. 
B.   Begin Treatment After All Appeals Have Been Exhausted 
Another solution would be to begin treatment after all avenues 
of appeal have been exhausted.  Minnesota prison therapists follow 
this practice today.244  This practice avoids some Fifth Amendment 
violations because the offender would no longer have a reasonable 
fear that his statements would be used against him in a future 
criminal proceeding related to the convicted offense.245 
However, an offender who testified in his own defense could 
still face charges of perjury as well as charges for previous crimes 
that have never been charged.246  This alone would be enough to 
prevent an offender from freely discussing his crimes in therapy, 
thus forcing him to decide once more between participating in 
therapy and extending his supervised release date. 
Furthermore, the appeals process can be lenghty, and there 
have been instances in which an offender was forced to choose 
between pursuing his appeal and participating in therapy.247  The 
offender would also have to forego any post-conviction remedies 
that may be available to him beyond the first appeal.248  For these 
reasons, simply waiting until the time to appeal has passed is not a 
desirable alternative. 
 
 244. Goldman, supra note 41. 
 245. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 246. This was the argument made by Lile and Imlay.  See McKune v. Lile, 536 
U.S. 24, 55 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 983 
(Mont. 1991). 
 247. Goldman, supra note 41. 
 248. See Imlay, 813 P.2d at 983 (noting that a defendant has the post-conviction 
remedies of “motion for new trial (including the opportunity to discover new 
evidence), appeal, petition for certiorari, and collateral attack”). 
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C.   Grant Immunity to Statements Made in Therapy 
A grant of immunity promising that incriminating statements 
made in therapy will not be used against an offender in a future 
criminal proceeding could help eliminate potential Fifth 
Amendment issues that exist with the current system of 
treatment.249  But the grant of immunity must be specific and 
official to be effective.  The Morrow court found no coercion 
because the Commissioner did not require a waiver of immunity 
from Morrow or insist that Morrow’s statements would be used 
against him in the future.250  This type of “gentleman’s agreement” 
between the State and the offender is not enough because it is not 
a guarantee that the statements will not be used in the future.251 
Prosecutors are hesitant to grant immunity because their 
primary goal is to convict sex offenders of their crimes and courts 
do not want to tread on the probation rights of the executive 
branch.252  But immunity would not harm the State’s interests if it 
does not plan to use the statements in the future.  Immunity would 
also encourage the offender to accept responsibility and complete 
the therapy process.253 
Offering immunity will also further the goal of developing a 
successful relapse prevention plan.254  As discussed above, it is 
essential that the offender disclose all past offenses in order to 
create a plan based on “the thoughts, feelings and decisions which 
preceded [the] past offenses.”255  An offender would be much more 
willing to talk openly if there was no fear that his statements would 
be used against him in a criminal prosecution. 
Immunity, however, would not solve all of the problems.  First, 
the mere fact of the offender’s participation in the SOTP, even 
without his incriminating statements, shows that he admitted to the 
crime.  Second, immunity would not keep the offender’s 
statements from being used against him in a civil commitment 
hearing.256  The right against self-incrimination only applies to 
 
 249. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973); see also supra Part III.B.1. 
 250. State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Minn. 1999). 
 251. See Tanabe, supra note 10, at 851-52. 
 252. Shevlin, supra note 10, at 503. 
 253. See Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1224. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at 1223-24.  “If [the offenders] do not seek treatment in prison, the 
government can use this fact against them in a subsequent Sexually Violent Person 
(SVP) commitment.  If they do seek treatment, the government may use 
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future criminal proceedings, and a civil commitment hearing is, by 
definition, a civil proceeding.  Therefore, although immunity 
removes most of the Fifth Amendment violations, it is not ideal 
because it would not encourage an offender who feared civil 
commitment to cooperate with therapy.257 
D.   Legislative Changes to Sex Offender Sentencing Laws 
Legislative changes to sex offenders’ sentences are not new.  
Guideline sentences for sex offenders have been enhanced a 
number of times since the Guidelines were promulgated.258  In 
1989, sentences were doubled and long term supervision was 
required for offenders deemed to be “patterned predatory 
offender[s].”259  In 1992, life imprisonment was established for sex 
offenders convicted of first-degree sexual assault under certain 
circumstances.260  And in 2000, first-degree criminal sexual conduct 
offenders were subjected to a presumptive prison sentence of 144 
months.261 
The Legislature has the power to create a sentencing scheme 
for sex offenders that would remove any potential Fifth 
Amendment issues.  One option would be to eliminate the 
supervised release term for sex offenders.  This would avoid the 
constitutional issue and would serve society’s interest in keeping 
the offender off the streets for a longer duration of time.262  This 
method, however, would cost society more money to imprison the 
offender and would remove incentives for the offender to behave 
while in prison.263  The supervised release period is valuable 
because it allows the State to monitor the sex offender’s reentry 
into society.264  Furthermore, abandoning the sentencing guidelines 
 
information obtained from treatment against the offender in a subsequent SVP 
commitment.”  Id. (quoting John Q. LaFond, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and 
Registration and Community Notification Laws: Policy Analysis: The Costs of Enacting a 
Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 468, 496 (1998)); see also Lile v. 
McKune, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1157 n.6 (D. Kan. 1998) (recognizing that Lile’s 
statements would not be protected in civil commitment proceedings). 
 257. Schlank & Harry, supra note 28, at 1223. 
 258. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 2. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Of course, all changes made by the Legislature would have to comport 
with constitutional requirements. 
 263. ELLISON, supra note 23, at 2. 
 264. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 15. 
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for an entire class of criminals is an extreme step that could create 
more problems than it would solve. 
There are more preferable options the Legislature can pursue.  
For example, in 2004 Governor Pawlenty formed the Governor’s 
Commission on Sex Offender Policy to review existing policies and 
laws and to recommend changes.265  The Commission 
recommended a number of changes to Minnesota’s sentencing 
practices.266  One recommendation is the “[d]evelopment of a 
blended determinate-indeterminate sentencing system for sex 
offenders,” involving doubling statutory maximum sentences and 
“vigorous . . . reviews of the offender’s response to treatment while 
in custody.”267  If the implementation of this recommendation 
resulted in the offender no longer being guaranteed a supervised 
release date, then the constitutional violation would be removed.268 
These are just some of the possible solutions.  The best 
alternative would be to utilize treatment methods that would not 
require offenders to admit the offense because the Fifth 
Amendment violation would be eliminated and more offenders 
would receive treatment.  However, if that is not possible, then one 
of the other solutions, or perhaps a mix of the solutions, would be 
preferable over what is in place today. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Society has a strong interest in rehabilitating sex offenders 
before their release from prison.  However, as this Note has shown, 
Minnesota’s current SOTP likely violates the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.  Bringing it in conformity with the 
requirements of the Constitution would benefit society greatly by 
avoiding constitutional challenges in the future.  Furthermore, a 
program that complies with the Constitution will allow treatment 
providers to focus their efforts on rehabilitation without fear of 
 
 265. Id. at 7. 
 266. Id. at 1-2. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Other recommendations from the Final Report include the creation of a 
sex offender release board that would have the authority to determine when sex 
offenders should be released from prison and their conditions for supervised 
release and increasing the maximum sentence to life for sex offenders with a prior 
history of criminal sexual conduct.  Id.  The recommendation to create a sex 
offender release board would most likely not avoid the constitutional problems 
highlighted in Murphy and Kaquatosh if refusal to incriminate oneself resulted in 
revocation of parole.  See discussion supra Parts IV.A, V.B. 
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violating the Fifth Amendment.269 
But most importantly, a system that encourages people to 
incriminate themselves and penalizes them for refusing to do so 
should not be allowed to survive.  As Justice Stevens wrote in his 
McKune dissent, “we ought to ask ourselves—what if this is one of 




 269. This Note does not discount the importance of rehabilitation and the 
work done by therapists.  Rather, its goal is to point out the inherent problems 
with the system with the goal of finding a solution that will avoid the self-
incrimination problem and allow the therapists to focus on rehabilitating 
offenders. 
 270. 536 U.S. 24, 71-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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